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Abstract
Two−firm horizontal Cournot mergers give rise to multi−plant firms in spatial markets. We
study location equilibria on the circle for competition between a two−store merged entity and
one then two single−store competitors. Several results turn up. First of all, we get equilibrium
location patterns that could not have been obtained on the segment. Secondly, we investigate
the profitability of such mergers and find that they turn out to be unprofitable much earlier.
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Horizontal mergers have long been known to raise puzzling questions on their
proﬁtability. In the widely used standard Cournot model (linear, symmetric, ho-
mogenous good, simultaneous game), horizontal mergers are simply not proﬁtable,
as shown by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983). However, changing certain hy-
potheses of the standard model does yield diﬀerent results. Assuming strategic
complementarity instead (as in the Bertrand model) is enough to restore the in-
ternal proﬁtability. Dropping the constant identical marginal costs also helps, just
like assuming enough diﬀerentiation among the products.
Introducing a spatial framework basically preserves the conclusions obtained
in the non spatial setting. More precisely, horizontal mergers in shipping spatial
linear models with homogeneous good and Cournot competition cannot be prof-
itable unless ﬁrms relocate. McAﬀee, Simmons and Williamson (1992) suggested
the contrary, since the transport cost induces a marginal delivery cost asymmetry
between ﬁrms at any location in the market. The merged ﬁrm keeps then open
both outlets (in contrast with the non spatial model), and potentially beneﬁts
from its bigger size. Nevertheless, Norman and Pepall (1998) show that this is
not enough to restore internal proﬁtability, since spatial markets are segmented
in a standard linear shipping model with quantity competition. Without arbi-
trage on behalf of consumers, independent Cournot equilibria obtain at each local
market due to local constant returns to scale, and therefore the merger paradox
is present on each of these spatially separated markets. Marginal delivery cost
asymmetry is not enough to reverse the unproﬁtability result: simple output re-
allocation between aﬃliates does not generate a suﬃcient cost advantage to the
merged entity, and this was already the case in the non-spatial models.
In turn, if relocation is allowed for, the delivery cost asymmetry can endoge-
nously increase. Norman and Pepall (2000) show that the endogenous location
in the post-merger game does make a merger proﬁtable if the segment market
is suﬃciently concentrated (less than eight ﬁrms initially). Actually, they argue
that besides the endogenous location, it is the behavioral asymmetry between
the insiders and the outsiders at this stage of the game that makes the merger
proﬁtable.
We may brieﬂy remind here that the two main reasons behind the merger
paradox in Cournot models are the strategic substitution and the incapacity of
the merged entity to commit to a higher level of output in the post-merger game1.
1The importance of commitment was revealed by Daughety (1990), who allowed the merged
1In their paper, Norman and Pepall (2000) stick with the spatial Cournot compe-
tition but model a Stackelberg-in-location stage before the quantity stage. The
location ﬁrst mover advantage is presented as a key factor leading to a bigger and
better ﬁrm, thus enjoying a net absolute advantage over its competitors w.r.t.
a certain group of consumers who become its captive demand (in their setting,
a merger allows the two stores to coordinate their relocation choices in order to
better adjust them to consumer locations). However, they acknowledge that their
Stackelberg-in-location outcome can be replicated by a simultaneous relocation
stage, on condition that the merged entity chooses two distinct locations for its
aﬃliates so as to prevent overlapping of their respective market areas. Therefore,
t h es i m u l t a n e o u sl o c a t i o ng a m ea n dt h es e q u e n t i a lo n ec a ng i v ei d e n t i c a lo u t c o m e s .
We conclude then that the location sequentiality assumption is not essential for
their proﬁtability result, and go on to look for an alternative explanation.
Basically, we raise the question of how the scope for proﬁtable spatial horizon-
tal mergers depends on the type of underlying location model. Our work builds
on the framework of Norman and Pepall (2000), up to the space circularity. We
argue that the shape of the space is a supplementary yet essential condition to
be taken into account, because their result of internal proﬁtability on the seg-
ment is actually due to the border eﬀect present on such an exogenously bounded
market, and not to the behavioral asymmetry assumption. We claim that the
incentives to merge are higher in the linear city than in the circular one, and put
t h i sd o w nt ot h ef a c tt h a tt h es e g m e n ti sa na s y m m e t r i cl o c a t i o ns t r u c t u r et ot h e
e x t e n tt h a tl o c a t i o n sa r en o th o m o g e n o u sa so nt h ec i r c l e .I ti st h i sa s y m m e t r y
that leads to minimum diﬀerentiation (as shown by Anderson and Neven (1991)),
since everybody’s preferred location is the mid-point of the segment2.M e r g i n g
gives the opportunity to reach at lower cost the distant demand, and to lower
the competitive pressure on the mid-segment location. We show here that despite
relocation, mergers on the circle become unproﬁtable much earlier (starting with
four ﬁrms on the market). Lack of a unique most-preferred location lets the com-
petition eﬀect dominate, and ﬁrms never agglomerate at the same location on the
circle3. Merging brings rival outlets closer together, so post-merger competition is
entity to act as a Stackelberg leader and thus restored the merger’s internal proﬁtability.
2Firms are optimally located when total quantity delivered to the right equals that on the
left (the quantity median property, in the terms of Pal and Sarkar (2002)). When all ﬁrms are
single-store, the quantity median location is the same and unique for all, the mid-point of the
segment. This is due to the presence of exogenous endpoints which limit the market areas of all
ﬁrms in the same way.
3On the circle there is no single median point. All locations are ap r i o r ialike, and they can
2more intense than on the segment. A larger increase in market power is therefore
required to make the merger proﬁtable, which actually happens when ﬁrms merge
to form a duopoly. In return, the outsiders’ free-riding dominates in a merger to
triopoly, making it unproﬁtable. Our model examines these two particular cases
in detail, in order to point out that a certain degree of asymmetry or heterogeneity
on the market (of which merged ﬁrms may take advantage of) is necessary to have
suﬃcient incentives to merge.
Our paper has a double purpose. First of all, we wish to remind that con-
clusions might largely diﬀer once the linear space assumption is replaced by the
circular one. Location models often concluded that Bertrand competition yielded
spatial dispersion, as compared with Cournot, which actually gave the opposite
result, before counter examples revealed the importance of the assumption on the
shape of the market. Likewise, we bring froward the possibility for the proﬁtabil-
ity of spatial mergers to depend essentially on the same assumption. After all,
even if the largest part of the literature on spatial competition builds on the uni-
tary segment hypothesis, certain real situations are better approximated by the
circular city framework.
We recall for instance that any spatial model is supposed to be a tractable
way to model ﬁrms’ choice of product speciﬁcation. Typical examples include
circular towns spreading around lakes, for which consumers cannot generally af-
ford to cross the lake when going shopping, and therefore department stores take
up locations around the lake. Also, in the case of traﬃc-jammed cities, shop-
ping malls are located on the outskirts, on the circular belt-way, so as to avoid
consumers the downtown traﬃc. Finally, choosing ﬁrms’ locations on the circle
equally approximates the mechanism of ﬂexible manufacturing, where the basic
product (standing for the location of the ﬁrm) is then customized at a certain cost
(here, the shipping cost) so as to make it available to consumers4.
At the same time, we also remind that a set of consumers with preferences
deﬁned on a set of goods can normally be represented by such a location model,
which actually was in the beginning the very purpose of the analogy between the
spatial setting and the product diﬀerentiation framework. As far as the linear rep-
all potentially satisfy the quantity median property, it all depends on competitors’ locations.
There is no exogenous border constraint for ﬁms to take up the same location, therefore by not
clustering all at the same point, ﬁrms are able to reduce competitive pressure.
4Other examples of the circular framework modeling ﬁrm’s choice of product speciﬁcation
include television networks choosing time slots for their programmes, or rival airlines choosing
the arrival and departure times for their ﬂights.
3resentation is concerned, it applies to single-peaked consumer’s preferences5.N o
such analogy is available for preferences represented by the circular model, which
m i g h tb ec o n s i d e r e da sad r a w b a c kw h e nm a k i n gt h ec h o i c eo fap a r t i c u l a rs p a t i a l
representation over another. Moreover, the linear structure is characterized by
the presence of a unique median consumer, which is contradicted on the circle6.
The circular representation appears particularly special in light of all this. Perfect
symmetry in locations mirrors the multiplicity of median consumers, and this is
what gives rise to the partial clustering result of Gupta et al. (2004), as well as to
our intuition on the relation between merger incentives and market (a)symmetry.
Last but not least, Horstmann and Slivinski (1985) also note that consumer pref-
erence restrictions imply that in the case of the circular representation, products
that are no individual’s least preferred good simply do not exist (they would be lo-
cated inside the circumference), whereas they abound in the linearly representable
structure. In other words, all varieties on the circle are someone’s most preferred
commodity and someone else’s least preferred commodity, which is not the case
for varieties on the segment.
We might therefore venture the following remarks on the choice between the
circular framework and the linear one: the former might be more appropriate for
global markets, where border eﬀects are virtually inexistent, and where diﬀerent
varieties may more easily satisfy the above conditions. The latter might approx-
imate regional or national markets, where border eﬀects may be more powerful.
Informally, if we interpret the existence of borders as giving rise to opportunities
for obtaining some captive demand (exploiting commercial niches, for instance),
then the circular framework might be more useful for modelling steady, mature
markets, where such opportunities have disappeared, whereas the linear setting
would represent expanding markets, where such niches still exist.
Second of all, this paper contributes to the question of location choices of
multi-store ﬁrms. On the segment, location equilibria for multi-store ﬁrms have
already been worked out. Pal and Sarkar (2002) exhaustively analyze competition
between multi-store ﬁrms on the segment, and prove that the complex problem of
determining equilibrium store locations can be approximated by a lot simpler one.
Note that this is also entirely possible thanks to the existence of endpoints. On
5See for instance Black (1948) for this well-known result in social choice literature.
6Actually, given any pair of goods over which consumers’ preferences are deﬁned, on the
circle there are always two such median consumers indiﬀerent between them, whose preference
orderings are exactly opposite one another. See Horstmann and Slivinski (1985) for more details
on this median consumer and consumers’ preferences represented by location models.
4the circle, where all locations are ap r i o r ihomogeneous, Chamorro-Rivas (2000)
chooses a certain perfectly symmetric framework, i.e. a two-plant duopoly, to
obtain the ’equidistance result’. We contribute by solving out for the location
equilibria between a two-plant ﬁrm and one or two single-plant competitors. The
’equidistance result’ can be obtained only in the latter case. In turn, it is obvious
that as compared with the linear framework, multiplicity is likely to character-
ize the multi-plant location equilibria, also due to the lack of a unique median
consumer. More insight is necessary w.r.t. the circular space assumption - we
conjecture for instance that the number of ﬁrms and that of plants are important
parameters.
The paper is organized as follows: we begin by introducing the base model,
then we discuss in order mergers to duopoly and triopoly. Each time we identify
ﬁrst location equilibria after merger, then establish the (un)proﬁtability result.
2. Model
An inﬁnite number of consumers are uniformly located on the unit circle. Three
identical single-store ﬁrms (we discuss later the four-ﬁrm case) produce a homo-
geneous good with the same technology characterized by constant marginal costs,
normalized to zero. Firm’s i location is denoted by xi,i=1 ,2,3. At any consumer
location x on the circle, demand is given by p(x)=a − Q(x), a>0,w h e r ep(x)
is the product price at that location and Q(x) is the total output supplied at x.
Firms incur transport costs t|x − xi|, linear in distance and quantity, in order to
ship output to consumers7. Consumers have a prohibitive costly transport cost,
preventing arbitrage, so ﬁrms can and will price discriminate across the set of
spatially diﬀerentiated markets. Given constant marginal delivery costs, a set of
independent Cournot equilibria obtains for each location x on the circle. There
are no set-up or (re)location costs, and there is neither entry on nor exit from
t h em a r k e t( e a c hﬁrm supplies a positive quantity at every local market). Start-
ing from an initial location equilibrium, two ﬁrms merge (an exogenous decision).
A two-period post-merger game takes place: ﬁrst ﬁrms relocate simultaneously
and then they simultaneously play Cournot. The equilibrium concept used is the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
7t is a positive constant, and the norm stands for the shorter distance of the two
possible ways to ship goods along the circumference. Since the transport cost parameter
enters as a multiple in the proﬁts expression, for our proﬁtability analysis we will assume
t =1without loss of generality.
52.1 Merger to duopoly
Two among the three ﬁrms on the circle decide to merge. We identify the
location equilibria both before and after merger, so as to compare proﬁts. In
contrast with the linear market, the merger to duopoly on the circle exhibits a
lower proﬁtability range and multiple location equilibria.
Using the analysis of Shimizu and Matsumura (2003), we can list all location
equilibria on the pre-merger market. There can be no more than three distinct
locations. Actually, all ﬁrms clustering at the same point is never an equilib-
rium on the circle, so ﬁrms choose either two or three distinct locations. In the
two-location equilibrium, ﬁrms locate diametrically, whereas the three distinct lo-
cations pattern is the equidistant one. To sum up, there are only two equilibria
before merger: two ﬁr m si n0a n dt h et h i r di n1 / 2( d i a m e t r i c a lp a t t e r n ) ,a n do n e
ﬁrm in 0, the second in 1/3 and the third in 2/3 (equidistant pattern)8.
Insert Figure 1.
In order to get the optimal locations after merger, denote now by r (r ∈
[0,1/2]) the location of the single-store ﬁrm, and by d and 1 −d those of the two
aﬃliates9 (where d ∈ (0,1/2)). The equilibrium proﬁt sw r i t ea sf o l l o w s :
9 × Πmerged =
R 1/2
0 [a + |r − x| − 2|d − x|]
2 dx +
R 1




0 [a + |d − x| − 2|r − x|]
2 dx+
R 1
1/2 [a + |1 − d − x| − 2|r − x|]
2 dx (2)
The optimal locations result from proﬁts’ maximization w.r.t. d and r re-
spectively. Depending on the relative position of the single-store ﬁrm w.r.t. the
two aﬃliates, the discussion is divided in three subcases10. I nt h ee n do n l yt w o
equilibrium patterns turn up: the ﬁrst one is like a degenerate segment, with the
8This is obtained alternatively by solving out explicitly for the location equilibrium
game, which is much more time- and space-consuming. Proof is of course available on
request. (A sample resolution of a circular Cournot model is available in Matsushima
(2001).)
9Following Pal and Sarkar (2002), we know that the two aﬃliates will never share the
same location. Moreover, on each side of an aﬃliate, its market area extends up to the
midpoint between itself and the other aﬃliate. There is no market area overlapping, and
basically each outlet supplies on half a circle. We can always denote the two midpoints
by 0 and 1/2, for ease of computation and exposition, and without any loss of generality.
10Actually, we need to consider both the position of the single-store and that of the
point opposite to it, because both locations enter the proﬁt expression. Say for instance
that r ∈[0,1/2 − d] (the resolution for the two other cases is similar and available on
request): then optimal r =0and optimal d = a−1
4
√
16a2 − 8a +2 .
6outsider at mid-distance between the two insiders11.W ec a l lt h i sT y p e1e q u i l i b -
rium. In return, the second pattern could not have been obtained on the segment:
the aﬃliates locate as a two-store monopoly (i.e. diametrically), but the outsider
and one of the insiders share the same location. We call this Type 2 equilibrium.
Insert Figure 2
The two pre-merger equilibria yield diﬀerent equilibrium proﬁts. Firms obvi-
ously make identical proﬁts in the equidistant case, but in the diametrical one,
ﬁr m sa t0g e tal o w e rp r o ﬁt than the one at 1/2. Similarly, post-merger patterns are
not equivalent,w i t ht h em e r g e dﬁrm performing better on the so-called degener-
ate segment. We summarize next the proﬁt comparison (six subcases), where ∆Π




and Pepall (2000), we look for the range of values of a (the demand parameter,
maximum reservation price) satisfying the condition for positive quantities (that
is a>n / 2, which becomes here a>1.5.) and allowing for a proﬁtable merger.
Insert Table 1
The proﬁtability range is smaller on the circle, regardless of the subcase we
discuss. On the segment12, the (unique) proﬁtability interval was (1.5,4.4089].
Merger to duopoly is actually less proﬁtable on the circle, because starting from
less rivalry before merger, we end up with more competition afterwards, due
to the location pattern that results from post-merger relocation. The unique
initial equilibrium on the segment had all ﬁrms in the middle (see Anderson and
Neven (1991)). On the circle, at most two ﬁrms share the same location before
merger, so initial individual proﬁts are higher than on the segment. Afterwards,
the merged ﬁrm is better oﬀ in the segment-like pattern (Type 1), but even then
the proﬁtability range is smaller than on the segment. There, the merged entity
enjoyed some captive demand between its stores and the line’s ends, since the
outsiders remained in the middle. This captive demand eﬀect still exists on the
circle in the segment-like case, but is weaker because of the cannibalization risk
between the two outlets in the region of 1/2. Exogenous borders lower this risk
to zero on the segment. Conversely, in Type 2 equilibrium the aﬃliates do choose
monopoly locations, but this location advantage is shared with the outsider, so
the proﬁtability range is even smaller than in the segment-like case.
11The equilibrium locations are exactly what they were on the segment, since we ﬁnd
the same expression for the optimal d (see footnote 4) as Norman and Pepall (2000).
12See Norman and Pepall (2000).
72.2 Merger to triopoly
We start again with the pre-merger location analysis and go on to determine
the location post-merger equilibria, so as to compare proﬁts. This merger turns
out to be unproﬁtable.
A qualitative analysis of the pre-merger market gives all initial location equi-
libria. The four-ﬁrm location equilibrium may exhibit two, three or four distinct
locations. Following Shimizu and Matsumura (2003), we know that the two-
location equilibrium has two ﬁrms at each end of a diameter. Rather tedious
computations show that we cannot have an equilibrium with three distinct loca-
tions (proof available on request). Finally, there are an inﬁnity of four-location
equilibria, with ﬁrms at the ends of any two diameters, as shown by Gupta et al.
(2004). However, it is straightforward to show that all these equilibria (both with
two and four distinct locations) are equivalent in terms of proﬁts for all ﬁrms.
To sum up, we have two pre-merger equilibrium patterns: two ﬁr m sa t0a n dt h e
other two at 1/2, and each time a ﬁrm at the end of a diameter. For ease of
computation we shall nevertheless use two perpendicular diameters, without any
loss of generality whatsoever.
Insert Figure 3.
Denote by p and r respectively the two outsiders’ locations, and again by d
and 1−d the locations of the two aﬃliates (where d ∈ (0,1/2)). Proﬁts in location
equilibrium write as follows:
16 × Πp=
R 1/2
0 [a + |r − x| + |d − x| − 3|p − x|]
2 dx+ R 1




0 [a + |p − x| + |d − x| − 3|r − x|]
2 dx+ R 1




0 [a + |r − x| + |p − x| − 3|d − x|]
2 dx+ R 1
1/2 [a + |r − x| + |p − x| − 3|1 − d − x|]
2 dx (5)
We obtain the candidates to optimal locations by solving the simultaneous
system formed by the ﬁrst order conditions in p,r and d respectively on the above
proﬁts13. Checking for the second order conditions gives us the equilibrium loca-
t i o n s .T h eb o t t o ml i n ei st h a tb o t ht h et w oa ﬃliates and the two outsiders locate
13Twelve cases need to be discussed, depending on the relative positions of the two single-store
competitors w.r.t. the two aﬃliates. Computations are tedious and take much space, but are of
course available on request.
8diametrically14. Basically, either the two aﬃliates locate at 1/4 and 3/4 and the
two outsiders locate either at 0 and 1/2 respectively, or the latter share each the
location of an aﬃliate, i.e. 1/4 and 3/4.
Insert Figure 4.
It can be easily checked that after merger all location equilibria are equivalent,
i.e. they yield the same proﬁts for each and every ﬁrm. Remember that we had
the same remark applying to equilibria before merger. Consequently, the proﬁt
comparison is quite simple:
2 × Πﬁrms















The conclusion is straightforward: the merger to triopoly is not proﬁtable.
Note that this time there is no captive demand available at all, since in both
equilibrium patterns, each aﬃliate faces an outsider on each side. Consequently,
despite relocation, the merged entity cannot isolate itself from outsiders’ compe-
tition15.
3. Conclusion
To sum up, this paper basically claims that incentives to merge are higher
when there is some form of market asymmetry that ﬁrms may beneﬁtf r o m .W e
show here by two examples that on the circle, horizontal Cournot mergers with
endogenous location become unproﬁtable much "earlier" than on the segment,
that is for a lower number of ﬁrms on the market. On the circle, a merger to
triopoly is not proﬁtable, whereas on the segment the proﬁtability result was
valid up to initially eight ﬁrms. This suggests that the circular market is much
more subject to the merger paradox than the segment, and that for more than four
ﬁr m sa l lm e r g e r sm a yw e l ln o tb ep r o ﬁtable. This conjecture still wants formal
proof for the time being.
The second point we make in this paper concerns spatial competition between
multi-plant ﬁrms. On the circle, this analysis is yet incomplete, and we contribute
by working out two particular cases. We argue that the number of plants of
the merged ﬁrm, as well as the number of single-store competitors are essential
parameters in presence of the circularity assumption. Remember that with a
single competitor, we obtained a partial agglomeration equilibrium pattern that
14For instance, in the case where p ∈[d,1/2] and r ∈[1/2,1 − d], we obtain the following
optimal locations: p =1 /4, r =3 /4, d =1 /4.
15Remember that without relocation, such mergers are not proﬁtable, and here the post-
merger location patterns merely replicate those from before merger.
9was impossible on the segment: an aﬃliate and the single-store competitor sharing
the same location. Similarly, a two-store merged entity may share exactly the same
locations as its two single-store competitors, which again could not happen on the
segment16.
More insight is needed on the spatial competition between multi-store ﬁrms.
So far, completely asymmetric ﬁrms in their number of aﬃliates (more than one)
have not been considered. It would be though quite necessary, in order to better
assess the implications of merger control in spatial markets and to infer eﬀects of
divestiture injunctions.
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Figure 1 : Location equilibria before merger to duopoly 
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Figure 2 : Location equilibria after merger to duopoly 
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Figure 3 : Location equilibria before merger to triopoly 
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Figure 4 : Location equilibria after merger to triopoly 
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